We show how to securely obfuscate conjunctions, which are functions f (x1, . . . , xn) = ∧ i∈I yi where I ⊆ [n] and each literal yi is either just xi or ¬xi e.g., f (x1, . . . , xn) = x1 ∧ ¬x3 ∧ ¬x7 · · · ∧ xn−1. Whereas prior work of Brakerski and Rothblum (CRYPTO 2013) showed how to achieve this using a non-standard object called cryptographic multilinear maps, our scheme is based on an "entropic" variant of the Ring Learning with Errors (Ring LWE) assumption. As our core tool, we prove that hardness assumptions on the recent multilinear map construction of Gentry, Gorbunov and Halevi (TCC 2015) can be established based on entropic Ring LWE. We view this as a first step towards proving the security of additional multilinear map based constructions, and in particular program obfuscators, under standard assumptions.
INTRODUCTION
Program Obfuscation [6, 24, 4, 19] is a central cryptographic primitive which enables one to "encrypt" a program * This work was done in part while the authors were visiting the Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. [14] [15] [16] 2016 in a way that preserves its input-output behavior, yet hides its inner workings. There are several definitions of what it means to "hide the inner workings" of a program, including the virtual black-box definition and the weaker indistinguishability obfuscation definition of Barak et al. [4] . Rather unfortunately, Barak et al. also showed that general purpose virtual black-box obfuscation is unachievable. Still, notwithstanding the bleak outlook projected by this result, several positive results for obfuscation have emerged recently.
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In particular, several specific and useful classes of functions have been shown to be virtual black-box obfuscatable. This includes constructions of point function obfuscators either in the random oracle model [6, 29] or assuming exponentially strong one-way functions [34] , hyperplane obfuscators assuming strong DDH [7] , and very recently conjunction obfuscators and average-case evasive function obfuscators under strong assumptions on multilinear maps [5, 3] . Weakening the definition of obfuscation to an indistinguishability-based notion [4, 23] (called IO obfuscation), Garg, Gentry, Halevi, Raykova, Sahai and Waters [19] showed how to IO-obfuscate any family of polynomial-size circuits.
In this work, we address the question of whether VBB obfuscation of advanced functionalities can be based on standard assumptions. Our contribution is the construction of an average-case virtual black-box obfuscator for conjunctions assuming an entropic version of the Ring learning with errors (Ring LWE) assumption. Our construction uses the techniques of [5] and the recent multilinear map candidate of Gentry, Gorbunov and Halevi [20] . Our main contribution is the first proof technique for a non-trivial obfuscator under an assumption related to a standard and well-studied problem (namely, a generalization of Ring LWE to entropic secrets).
Conjunctions.
We define conjunctions as functions of the form f (x1, . . . , xn) = ∧ i∈I yi with literals yi being either xi or ¬xi and I ⊆ [n]. Alternatively we can think of this as checking that the values xi : i ∈ I match some fixed pattern while values outside of I can be arbitrary. Perhaps the simplest way to represent conjunctions, which we will use by default in this work, is as a vector v ∈ {0, 1, ⋆} n where we define Fv(x1, . . . , xn) = 1 iff for all i ∈ [n] we have xi = vi or vi = ⋆. We refer to ⋆ as a "wildcard".
Conjunction Obfuscation. A conjunction obfuscator takes as input a conjunction function Fv and outputs an obfuscated program Πv such that Πv(x) = Fv(x) for all x. Our goal is to achieve virtual black box (VBB) security which says that the code of the program Πv reveals no more information than having black-box access to an oracle for the function Fv. We relax this requirement by considering a distributional VBB security, where we only require the above to hold when v is chosen from a distribution that has sufficient entropy, even when conditioned on the wildcard locations {i : vi = ⋆}.
Our Results and Assumption.
We show how to obfuscate conjunctions with distributional VBB security under a variant of the Ring LWE assumption, which we call entropic Ring LWE.
The Ring LWE assumption (for a ring R) says that, when s ∈ R is a random secret ring element then (A, sA + e) is indistinguishable from uniform, where A ∈ R m is random and e ∈ R m is a short Gaussian error. The entropic Ring LWE assumption says that, when s1, . . . , sn ∈ R are random (short) public ring elements and x ∈ {0, 1} n is a secret bitvector chosen from a high entropy distribution, then the Ring LWE assumption holds with s = ∏ i s
i as the secret. See Definition 2.7 for a precise statement.
Our Techniques
Directed Encoding. We rely on (a special case of) the construction of [20] which can be thought of as a variant of a multilinear map, that we call a directed encoding. For public keys A, A ′ ∈ R m , we define an encoding of a short ring element s ∈ R under A → A ′ as a short matrix R ∈ R m×m such that
where e is short Gaussian error. This allows us to multiply encodings R × = R1 · R2 so that, if R1 is an encoding of s1 under A0 → A1 and R2 is an encoding of s2 under A1 → A2 then R × is an encoding of s1 · s2 under A0 → A2. Furthermore, we can detect if a value R is an encoding of 0 under A → A ′ by checking whether AR is short. This also allows us to check for equality of encoded values.
Conjunction Obfuscator Construction.
To obfuscate a conjunction Fv with v ∈ {0, 1, ⋆} ℓ we do the following:
• Choose random short ring elements
• Create encodings R i,b of r i,b and encodings
• Choose random short ring element r ℓ+1 . Create the encodings R ℓ+1 of r ℓ+1 and S ℓ+1 of r ℓ+1 · ∏ ℓ i=1 si,v i where we let si,⋆ = si,0 = si,1 when vi = ⋆. These encodings are under A ℓ → A ℓ+1 .
Set the obfuscated program to be
To evaluate Πv on an input x ∈ {0, 1} ℓ we compute
If Fv(x) = 1 then both S * and R * are encodings of the same value r ℓ+1
then S * , R * are extremely unlikely to encode the same value. Therefore, we can compute the output of the program by testing for equality of encoded values.
To argue security, we rely on (entropic) Ring LWE to replace the components of the program Πv by random elements independent of v. As an important step of the proof, we show that the encodings satisfy a decisional Diffie Hellman (DDH) like security property: Given the encodings of ring elements r0, r0s0, r1, r1s1 under A → A ′ , one cannot distinguish whether s0 = s1 or whether s0, s1 are independent.
The Directed Encoding Abstraction. In the body of the paper, we present the construction through the abstraction of directed encoding schemes (as opposed to directly, starting from Ring LWE, as above). As Halevi recently observed [25] , we still lack a commonly accepted syntax for describing the intended functionality of multi-linear maps as well as a succinct description of the underlying hardness assumptions, along with a candidate that realizes the functionality and the hardness assumptions under simple and plausible intractability assumptions. We view our abstraction of directed encodings as an important step in that direction. We adopt the syntax and the candidate for directed encodings from [20] ; the novelty of this work lies in (i) putting forth concrete hardness assumptions about directed encodings, (ii) showing that the functionality and these hardness assumptions for directed encodings already suffices for the application to obfuscating conjunctions as in [5] , and most importantly, (iii) demonstrating a reduction of these hardness assumptions to standard ring LWE assumptions and a simple and plausible strengthening there-of.
Discussion
All of the known approaches for obfuscation beyond point functions rely on multi-linear maps. A crucial theoretical limitation of these approaches is that they all rely on nonstandard assumptions; we have few candidates for multilinear maps [18, 12, 20, 13] and the corresponding assumptions are presently poorly understood and not extensively studied in cryptanalysis, and in many cases, broken [8, 11, 28, 9, 32, 10] . Indeed, these latter attacks highlight the importance of obtaining constructions and developing techniques that work under standard cryptographic assumptions, as is the focus of this work.
Our work may be viewed as taking a step towards basing obfuscation on standard assumptions, starting with conjunctions, which is an important special case of evasive functions, namely functions for which it is hard to find an input that evaluates to 0. As articulated by Badrinarayanan et al. [2] , we can hope to obfuscate the class of evasive functions in a way that survives "all known attacks" on the multilinear maps, where no encodings of 0 can be created by a generic-model adversary. The reason this is meaningful is that all of the recent attacks on candidate multi-linear maps rely crucially on the ability of the adversary to create encodings of 0. We leave as an important open problem to extend our construction to the class of all evasive functions.
On the Entropic Ring LWE Assumption. A few works have studied entropic variants of the LWE assumption. Goldwasser, Kalai, Peikert and Vaikuntanathan [22] showed that, roughly speaking, LWE with n-dimensional secrets over Zq drawn from a distribution with min-entropy k is at least as hard as LWE with uniformly random secrets in O(k/ log q) dimensions. However, such a result is not known for Ring LWE to the best of our knowledge. Another source of difficulty is that the min-entropy of our secrets is o(log q), much too small for the results in [22] to be applicable, even if they do extend to the Ring LWE setting.
We view the question of understanding the entropic ring LWE assumption, both in the [22] range of parameters (namely, k = ω(log q)) as well as our more aggressive range of parameters (namely, k = o(log q)) to be very interesting questions for future research, with many potential applications. On Coron's Attack. Coron [10] recently came up with an attack against the multiparty key exchange protocol based on the GGH15 encoding scheme [20] . This attack relies on extraneous properties of the key-agreement protocol of GGH15 (which had no security reduction) and does not seem to contain any new insights that could be leveraged to attack the Ring-LWE assumption or its entropic variant on which our scheme is based. In a bit more detail, Coron's attack relies on the adversary being able to obtain many "encodings" of 0, a "feature" that is inherent to the key exchange protocol, but not present in our scheme. Indeed, we believe the attack only strengthens the premise of our paper, which focuses on provable security under a (almost) standard assumption, namely an entropic variant of Ring-LWE.
Organization of the Paper. We present an abstract framework for the syntax of directed encodings and its underlying assumptions in Section 3, and its instantiation in Section 4. In particular, the hardness assumptions are presented in Sections 3.1 (abstract) and 4.3 (concrete). We present our conjunction obfuscator in Section 5 relying only on our abstract framework.
PRELIMINARIES

Average Min-Entropy
We use information theoretic tools similar to those in [5] . Definition 2.1 (average min-entropy [15] ). Let X and Z be (possibly dependent) random variables, the average min entropy of X conditioned on Z is:
.
Lemma 2.1 ([15]). Let X, Y, Z be (possibly dependent) random variables, where the support of Z is of size
≤ 2 ℓ . Then H∞(X|Y, Z) ≥ H∞(X|Y ) − ℓ.
Distributional VBB Obfuscation
The notion of obfuscation discussed in this paper is distributional (or average case) VBB [16, 27, 26, 4] , defined as follows.
Definition 2.2 (Distributional VBB). Consider a circuit family C = {Cn} n∈N with input size n and let Obf be a p.p.t. algorithm, which takes as input a circuit C ∈ C, a security parameter λ ∈ N, and outputs a boolean circuit
Obf is an obfuscator for the distribution class D over the circuit family C, if it satisfies the following properties:
, where the probability is over the coin tosses of Obf.
Polynomial Slowdown:
For every λ ∈ N and C ∈ C, the circuit Obf(1 λ , C) is of size at most poly(|C|, λ). 
Distributional
Pr (C,aux)∼D λ ,Obf,Adv [Adv(Obf(1 λ , C), aux) = P (C)] − Pr (C,aux)∼D λ ,Sim [Sim C (1 λ , 1 |C| , aux) = P (C)] = negl(λ)
Conjunctions and Conjunction Obfuscators
The class of conjunctions
As an abuse of notation, we also use Fv denote the canonical circuit representation of the function Fv, from which it is easy to recover the value v.
We can define the set w = {i : vi = ⋆} corresponding to the "wildcard locations". The classes of conjunctions we are able to obfuscate are those where there is sufficient entropy in v, even when w is fully known. The following definition is adapted from [5] to also handle auxiliary input.
Definition 2.3 (Entropy Given Wildcards
We let Dα denote the class of all efficiently samplable distribution ensembles D = {D λ } such that D has α(λ)-entropy given wildcards.
Definition 2.4. We say that Obf is a α(λ)-distributional VBB obfuscator for conjunctions if it is a distributional VBB obfuscator for the class Dα consisting of all distribution ensembles D such that D has α(λ) entropy given wildcards.
We mention an alternate definition of obfuscation security that we call α(λ)-entropic security.
Definition 2.5. A conjunction obfuscator Obf satisfies α(λ)-entropic security if there exists a polynomial-size simulator Sim such that for all efficiently samplable distributions D ∈ Dα that have α(λ)-entropy given wildcards, we have
where
Note that, in the above definition, the simulator does not depend on the distribution D and therefore, we can think of this definition as saying that the obfuscation hides all properties of the distribution. Also note that the simulator here does not get any oracle access to Fv and therefore does not learn anything at all. As such it's clear that such a definition cannot be achieved for general circuits (where oracle access to the circuit can provide some useful information) but it does make sense for evasive functions. 
A Lemma on Entropic
. Then, by applying Lemma 2.1,
Therefore, by α(λ)-entropic security, we have
In particular, this means that
we get the proof of the lemma.
Lattice Preliminaries
For a vector x, we let ||x|| denote its ℓ2 norm and ||x||∞ denote its infinity norm. For a matrix R ∈ Z m×m we define ||R||| (resp. ||R||∞) as the ℓ2 (resp. infinity) length of the longest column of R. Let D Z m ,σ be the truncated discrete Gaussian distribution over Z m with parameter σ, that is, we replace the output by 0 whenever the || · ||∞ norm exceeds √ m · σ (this is statistically close to the discrete Gaussian distribution with parameter σ as long as m = ω(log λ)). (A, T, U, R) are within negl(n) statistical distance of each other for any polynomial k ∈ N: (A, T, U, s) .
This also extends to the ring setting with 
The Ring Learning with Errors Problem
We start by defining a simple special case of the ring LWE problem [30] . We define the operator MakePoly such that for all rings R, if a ∈ R n , then MakePoly(a) ∈ R[x] is the polynomial whose coefficients are the elements of a. If D is a distribution over R n then MakePoly(D) is the respective distribution over R [x] . Definition 2.6. Let n be a power of 2, and let R = Z[x]/⟨x n + 1⟩. Let q be such that q ≡ 1 (mod 2n) and define Rq = R/qR. Let m ∈ N and let χ be a distribution over the integers. The PLWEn,m,q,χ problem is the problem of distinguishing
The following is an immediate corollary from [17] , together with a standard Hermite Normal Form reduction, see e.g. [30] . 
We also define an entropic version of the problem as follows. 
DIRECTED ENCODING SCHEMES
Directed encoding schemes are a special case of graphinduced multi-linear maps of Gentry, Gorbunov and Halevi [20] , specialized to a line. Let RM be a ring. In this section, we present an abstract framework for the syntax of directed encodings and its underlying assumptions, and we describe our instantiation in Section 4.
Definition 3.1 (Directed encoding scheme). A directed encoding scheme associated with a message space M ⊆ RM is a tuple of p.p.t. algorithms
(Setup, Encode, REncode, Mult, EqualTest) which work as follows.
input a security parameter λ and an upper-bound L on the number of levels, generates a public key PK and a private encoding key EK.
• Encode PK 0 →PK 1 (EK0, s), on input a "source" key-pair (PK0, EK0), a "target" public key PK1, and a message m ∈ M, outputs an encoding c.
• REncode PK 0 →PK 1 (1 λ ), on input a "source" public key PK0 and a "target" public key PK1, outputs an encoding c.
• EqualTest PK 0 →PK 1 (c0, c1), on input two public keys PK0 and PK1, and two encodings c0, c1, outputs a bit b (signifying accept or reject).
• Mult(c1, c2), on input two encodings c1, c2, outputs an encoding c×.
We also extend Mult to handle multiple encodings in the natural way:
Informally, correctness stipulates that the encodings uniquely determine the underlying message, and that we can multiply up to L encodings.
Remark 3.1. We could extend this by an "addition" operation or adding a zero test capability, but we don't need it here.
Correctness. We write M i = {s1s2 · · · si : s1, s2, . . . , si ∈ M}. We require the following correctness properties from the scheme to hold with probability 1 − negl(λ) over
there exists a family of sets E
(1)
we have
Note that there is no correctness requirement for "malformed encodings" that do not belong to some E (L)
PK 0 ,PK 1 ,s .
Security Assumptions
For the security properties, we define an efficiently samplable distribution DM over M. We require the following security properties from the encoding scheme.
Property 1 (Graded External DH). For every polynomial L = L(λ) the following experiments exp
We can also define two special sub-cases of the GXDH assumption which are already useful. We define the 2-element GXDH, denoted GXDH-2, the same way as above but modify the experiments exp gxdh , exp rand to only output (PK0, PK1, EK0, c0, d0). We also define the 1-element GXDH, denoted GXDH-1, the same way as above but modify exp gxdh and exp rand to only output (PK0, PK1, EK0, c0). The following is clear.
Proposition 3.1. The GXDH security property implies GXDH-2 and GXDH-1.
Our second assumption is entropic security which is similar in spirit to, but weaker than, the "GCAN" assumption from [5] . In the GCAN assumption on multilinear maps, the adversary was given access to the complete encoding parameters of the scheme (which roughly correspond to the encoding keys EK0 and EK1 below). However, in our setting this assumption is seems too strong and quite possibly incorrect. We thus notice that so long as the adversary is unable to obtain the encoding key EK1 for the "target", we can establish security based on entropic RLWE (see Section 4.3) and this is in fact sufficient for our construction (see Section 5). ) , PK1, EK0, c0, c1, d0, d1) .
Property 2 (α-Entropic Security). For a parameter α = α(λ), we say that the encoding scheme is α-entropic secure if for all polynomial ℓ = ℓ(λ), L = L(λ) and all efficiently samplable distributions
6: Output (PK0, PK1, EK0, c0, c1, d0, d1 ).
AN INSTANTIATION OF A DIRECTED ENCODING SCHEME
Let R be a degree-n number ring Z[x]/(f (x)) for some degree-n polynomial f (x). (We will be mostly agnostic of the specifics of what f (x) is, but encourage the reader to think of a cyclotomic polynomial f (x) = x n + 1 where n is a power of two.) Let q be a rational prime, and Rq = R/qR be the quotient ring. Let σ ∈ R + be the Gaussian standard deviation parameter.
The Encoding Scheme
• M = {s ∈ R : ∥s∥ ∞ ≤ m}.
• Encode A 0 →A 1 (s; T0), where (A0, T0), (A1, T1) ← Setup(1 λ ) and s ∈ R, works as follows.
-Output a matrix R0→1 ← GaussSamp(A0, b1; T0; σ).
We note that R0→1 ∈ R m×m and
is the public encoding procedure that simply samples a matrix R0→1 ← D m×m Z n ,σ .
• Mult(R, R ′ ) = RR ′ , where multiplication is done over Rq.
• EqualTest A 0 →A 1 (R0, R1) outputs "yes" if
and "no" otherwise. (Note that this procedure does not depend on A1 at all.)
As remarked above, we never use addition or extraction, in contrast to the encoding schemes of [18, 12, 13, 20] .
Correctness of the Encoding Scheme
Fix A0, A1 ∈ R m q throughout. We define
First, it is easy to check that the output of
We then establish correctness in the following lemmas:
, we have
Proof. The direction ⇐ is straight-forward. Now, suppose s0 ̸ = s1. Then, we have
The last line holds since, with overwhelming probability over the choice of A1, it holds that for all s ̸ = 0, ∥sA1∥ ∞ > q/4.
Lemma 4.2 (Correctness of Mult). For all i, j for which i+j
Proof. First, observe that
Now, write A0R0 = s0A1 + e0 and A1R1 = s1A1 + e1. Let us unfold the expression A0 · R0R1:
Hence,
where we used the bounds
Security of the Encoding Scheme
We prove the security properties of our encoding scheme (see Section 3.1) under the PLWE and the entropic PLWE assumption (see Section 2.5). These security properties are essentially analogous to the GXDH and GCAN assumptions from the work of Brakerski and Rothblum [5] . However, the key novelty in this work is that we are able to establish these security properties based on the hardness of problems relating to learning with errors over rings [30] . Proof. We first show that the distributions
and
are computationally indistinguishable under PLWE, where
We show the indistinguishability of (1) and (2) through a sequence of hybrid distributions.
Hybrid 1 is distribution (1).
Hybrid 2. This is the distribution
where e1 ← DRm,σ and e To finish the proof, note that the indistinguishability of distributions 1 and 2 immediately imply the indistinguishability of the following two distributions ( A0, T0, A1, GaussSamp(A0, r b A1 + e b ; T0),
Since this is exactly the distribution generated by REncode, this establishes GXDH.
Entropic security of our encoding scheme follows directly from the entropic PLWE assumption. We state the lemma below. 
THE CONJUNCTION OBFUSCATOR
Let (Setup, Encode, Mult, EqualTest) be a directed encoding scheme with associated with a message space M ⊆ RM for some ring RM , and a distribution DM over M. Given a conjunction Fv ∈ C conj ℓ represented via a vector v ∈ {0, 1, ⋆} ℓ , the obfuscator Πv ← Obf(1 λ , Fv) proceeds as follows.
• Choose (PKi, EKi) ← Setup(1 λ , 1 ℓ+1 ) for i ∈ {0, . . . , ℓ + 1}.
• Choose uniformly random s i,b , r i,b ← DM for every i ∈ [ℓ] and b ∈ {0, 1} subject to the condition that for every i such that vi = ⋆, we set si,0 = si,1. For such positions i, we define si,⋆ = si,0 = si,1.
•
and b ∈ {0, 1}.
The description 1 of the obfuscated program Πv consists of
The obfuscated program Πv, on input x ∈ {0, 1} ℓ , proceeds as follows.
• Compute S * ← Mult(S1,x 1 , S2,x 2 , . . . , S ℓ,x ℓ , R ℓ+1 ) and
• Output whatever EqualTest PK 0 →PK ℓ+1 (S * , R * ) outputs.
Theorem 5.1 (Distributional virtual black-box). Based on the GXDH and the α(λ)-entropic security properties on the directed encoding scheme, our obfuscator is an (α(λ) + 1)-distributional VBB obfuscator for conjunctions (Definition 2.4).
We first prove that the obfuscator is functionality preserving. The polynomial slowdown property follows directly by inspection.
Lemma 5.2 (Functionality).
There is a negligible function ν(λ) such that, for every ℓ ∈ N and every v ∈ {0, 1, ⋆} ℓ :
where the probability is over Πv ← Obf(1 λ , Fv).
Informally, functionality follows from the fact that with high probability,
si,x i Proof. Fix any ℓ ∈ N and v ∈ {0, 1, 
The program outputs 1 iff
which, by the correctness of the encoding scheme, happens iff s * = r * . This happens with probability 1 if Fv(x) = 1 and therefore correctness always holds in this case. On the other hand, if Fv(x) = 0 then let j be some index such that vj ̸ = ⋆ and xj ̸ = vj. We have
where NotInv is the event that one of r i,b , s i,b , r ℓ+1 (other than sj,x j ) is non-invertible and z = ∏ i̸ =j si,v i /si,x i . By lemma 2.5, we can bound the first probability by poly(λ)/q and the second probability is ≤ 2 −H∞(D M ) ≤ 1/q. By our choice of q, this is ≤ 2 −ℓ ν(λ) for some negligible ν(λ). Taking a union bound over all x ∈ {0, 1} ℓ , we get
which proves the lemma.
Next we prove that the obfuscator is secure. It suffices to prove that the obfuscator satisfies α(λ)-entropic security (Definition 2.5), as we can then rely on Lemma 2.2 to argue that this implies (α(λ) + 1)-distributional VBB security. 
) . We want to show that, for any efficiently samplable distribution D = {D λ } ∈ Dα having α(λ)-entropy given wildcards, the real distribution (Πv, aux) is indistinguishable from the simulated ( Π, aux) where (Fv, aux) ← D λ , Πv ← Obf(1 λ , Fv) and Π ← Sim(1 λ , 1 ℓ ). We do so via a series of hybrids.
Hybrid 0. This is the real distribution (Πv, aux) consisting of:
Hybrid 1. This is the distribution:
where everything is the same as in Hybrid 0 except that we now choose S ℓ+1 ← REncode PK ℓ →PK ℓ+1 (). 
The adversary Adv
′ gets 2ℓ + 1 random elements s1, . . . , s 2ℓ+1 , keys PK, PK ′ , EK, side information z = (aux, w) and an encoding c. It defines r ℓ+1 = s 2ℓ+1 and:
• si,0 := s2i−1 and si,1 := s2i for i ∈ [ℓ] \ w,
Note that this ensures that r ℓ+1 
where everything is the same as in Hybrid 1 except that we now choose R ℓ+1 ← REncode PK ℓ →PK ℓ+1 ().
Lemma 5.5. Hybrid 2 is indistinguishable from Hybrid 1 by GXDH-1 security of the encoding scheme.
Proof. Assume a ppt adversary Adv can distinguish Hybrids 1 and 2 with advantage ε. We construct an adversary Adv ′ that has advantage ε in the GXDH-1 security game. We claim that Hybrid 3.j and Hybrid' 3.j are indistinguishable. In particular, if there is a ppt adversary Adv that distinguishes Hybrid 3.j and Hybrid' 3.j with advantage ε then we construct a ppt adversary Adv ′ with advantage ε in the GXDH problem. The adversary Adv ′ (PK, PK ′ , EK, c0, c1, d0, d1) samples the distribution of Hybrid 3.j except that it sets PKj−1 := PK, EKj−1 := EK, PKj := PK ′ and, when vj ̸ = ⋆, it plugs in Rj,0 := c0, Rj,1 := c1, Sj,0 := d0, Sj,1 := d1. It then runs Adv on the sampled distribution. It is easy to see that when Adv ′ gets as input a GXDH tuple then the distribution it samples matches Hybrid 3.j and else it matches Hybrid' 3.j which proves the claim.
Next we define and intermediate distribution Hybrid" 3.j which is the same as Hybrid' 3.j except that when vj = ⋆ then the values {Sj,0, Rj,0} are also replaced by random { Sj,0, Rj,0}.
We claim that Hybrid' 3.j and Hybrid" 3.j are indistinguishable.
In particular, if there is a ppt distinguisher Adv that distinguishes Hybrid' 3.j and Hybrid" 3.j with advantage ε then we construct a ppt distinguisher Adv ′ with advantage ε in the GXDH-2 problem.
The adversary Adv ′ (PK, PK ′ , EK, c, d) samples the distribution of Hybrid' 3.j except that it sets PKj−1 := PK, EKj−1 := EK, PKj := PK ′ and, when vj = ⋆, it plugs in Rj,0 := c, Sj,0 := d. It then runs Adv on the sampled distribution. It is easy to see that when Adv ′ gets as input a GXDH tuple then the distribution it samples matches Hybrid' 3.j and else it matches Hybrid" 3.j which proves the claim.
Lastly, we claim that Hybrid" 3.j and Hybrid 3.(j − 1) are indistinguishable. The proof of this is identical to that showing the indistinguishability of Hybrid' 3.j and Hybrid" 3.j.
Combining the above, we get the proof of the lemma.
Combining the above we see that Hybrid 0 (obfuscated program) is indistinguishable from Hybrid 3.0 (simulated program) which proves the lemma.
